Introduction
In this paper I focus on some ideas from social and political philosophy concerning the ideal of freedom that I find useful for thinking about issues associated with the rise of the network society (Castells 1996) . The concept of freedom is highly elastic. It means all things to all people. This is especially true when we think of freedom in relation to the contemporary information and communication revolution. Diverse issues and concerns fall under the umbrella of freedom, and do so legitimately. If we are to understand what is at stake in particular assertions, however, and if we are to appeal convincingly to ideals of freedom to advance our claims and support our cases, we need to deal with the elasticity of "freedom". It is important that we recognize the extent to which freedom is a contested ideal and, indeed, a contested concept, that can be used to support specific positions and claims that are often in tension and frequently incompatible. Accordingly, I aim to do two things in this paper. First, I will do some analytic work on 'freedom'. Second, I will briefly illustrate this analytic work by reference to a small range of concrete examples, some of which will touch on the theme of sharing.
Of the many analytic 'tools' available for thinking about freedom conceptually and normatively I will deal briefly here with three variations around a single theme. These coalesce around what are often referred to as 'negative' and 'positive' conceptions of freedom and are as follows:
• The 'opportunity -exercise' (or 'formal -actual') analysis of 'freedom' • 'Negative' and 'Positive' freedom.
• The 'triadic relation' analysis of 'freedom' I will outline these briefly in turn. Before doing so, however, I want to make two short points. First, it is important not to underestimate how quickly and easily the freedom waters can get muddied. In a recent paper, Adrian Blau (2004) argues that the most famous treatment of positive and negative in 'recent' times, provided by Sir Isaiah Berlin (1958 Berlin ( /1969 , ranges over diverse specific renditions. According to Blau (2004: 548) : Berlin depicts negative freedom, variously, as the extent to which an agent is not interfered with, obstructed, or coerced. These three types of constraint are not the same, however, and Berlin is also inconsistent about what counts as legitimate or illegitimate constraints. But Berlin's account of negative freedom is at least more coherent than his account of positive freedom. According to David Miller, Berlin talks of positive freedom in three ways: (a) a positive power or capacity, as opposed to mere lack of constraint; (b) rational self-control, as opposed to impulsion by appetite; and (c) collective self rule, as opposed to being ruled by others. To these I would add a fourth, perhaps the most important: (d) doing what one should want, as opposed to doing what one does want. (Blau 2004: 548) This cautions us to be careful when trying to work with this ('negative' and 'positive' freedom) distinction; otherwise we may end up saying nothing very clear! Second, we need to keep in mind that there is much more involved in discussing freedom in the network society than simply getting the conceptual ground as clear as we can. Clarifying the concepts is at most a prelude -albeit, an important one -to addressing substantive normative issues at the level of ethical, social and political debate. My account of Maria Dimova-Cookson's (2001 re-interpretation of T.H. Green's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom is intended to serve as a bridge that links the conceptual and the substantive. More importantly, it is intended to remind us -in case we need reminding -that debate and struggle in the domain of issues associated with the rise of network societies is no more than a specific site or instance of a much larger debate and struggle. This is a struggle for influencing the 'shape' of ethics, politics, and law under postmodern conditions.
(i) The opportunity-exercise (or formal-actual) analysis of freedom
The opportunity-exercise analysis of freedom can be seen as distinguishing a formal freedom to pursue a desired end from an actual capacity to realize or to attain that end. This is similar to the distinction between an 'in principle' possibility and an 'in practice' realization. In principle (or formally), anyone in New York City or Calcutta is free to eat three good meals per day. In practice, however, many people lack the means to do so. In such cases it is often claimed that the person has a formal freedom but not an actual freedom. This is one version -a very straightforward one -of the distinction between negative and positive freedom. In the negative sense of being free to eat three good meals a day the point is that there is an absence of restrictions on doing so -the freedom is 'negative' because it consists in the absence of constraints like laws and physical impediments preventing people from eating three (or five or none) times a day. The idea of positive freedom, by contrast, is associated with a presence rather than an absence -in this case, the presence of food on three occasions each day (the presence of the means for actually doing what one wants or chooses to do). The individual in the example is said to lack positive freedom because they cannot actually access food.
Another way of putting this is to say that restrictions or constraints can be of different kinds. In some cases we facilitate freedom by taking something away -e.g., a law, a rule, that restricts someone from doing what they would do. In other cases, we can only facilitate freedom by putting something there that will not otherwise be there. In this sense, the distinction between negative and positive freedom corresponds to the distinction between 'non interference' rights and 'welfare' rights. The idea of 'actual' freedom or the 'exercise' sense of freedom has arisen because it has been seen that simply removing forms of interference commonly associated with (negative/libertarian) freedom is not enough to enable. It serves to draw attention to the fact that removing a certain range of constraints might actually produce very little benefit in the capacity of individuals and groups to satisfy their wants. Removing certain discrimination laws, for example, may not advance the material quality of life of many people formerly subject to them very much at all.
Whereas there is very little disagreement that the 'opportunity' (non interference) concept of freedom is a legitimate concept of freedom (freedom as not being prevented, impeded, or constrained from doing what you want to do or will otherwise do), many theorists dispute the 'exercise' (actual or capacity) concept of freedom.. They argue that 'freedom' only becomes an intelligible concept at the point where other people directly or indirectly (e.g., through laws) take steps to limit someone from doing what they want and are capable of doing should they choose to do it. Against this, proponents of 'positive'/'exercise' freedom argue that social arrangements that keep people poor or weak when there exist sufficient resources in the society for them to be not poor, or to be strong, do amount to imposing constraints or impediments, and should be seen as such.
It is important to recall that it makes no difference so far as limiting freedom is concerned whether an interference or impediment is appropriate or not. 'Legitimate' constraints limit freedom as much as unfair or non legitimate ones do. Once agreement is reached about what constitutes constraints to freedom and how far we are prepared to accept the coherence of an 'exercise' concept of freedom as well as an 'opportunity' concept, the important debate concerns the moral/ethical/political/social legitimacy of the constraints, and how to set about eliminating constraints that are not legitimate.
(ii) 'Negative' and 'Positive' Freedom as an ethical-metaphysical framework A distinction between positive and negative forms of freedom can be traced back in the western philosophical tradition to the Greeks (Socrates, Plato) and in the Christian tradition to St Paul, associated with tendencies to differentiate 'higher' and 'lower' desires/passions etc., and between 'real' or 'true' selves and 'base' or 'alien' selves. From this perspective which, as we will see, continues to the present day, part of the meaning of positive freedom involves the idea that a person's freedom is bound up with doing (especially, morally) 'good' sorts of things or being in 'good' sorts of ways; whereas negative freedom carries no such necessary connotations of (especially, moral) 'rectitude' or propriety, or conformity to metaphysical concepts of a 'true', 'real' or 'higher' self.
There are many variations around this theme. They derive from the metaphysics of free will, from some metaphysical doctrine of the soul as a person's true self, from a rationalist metaphysic of what humans most 'really' are, and from ethical-moral theories of the origins of goodness and the nature of the good life.
At their simplest, ideals of positive freedom traffic in conditions like not being a slave to one's passions or to inner states that one cannot control. For example, an alcoholic may be negatively free to purchase alcohol (they are legally entitled to, etc.), but because they are a 'slave' to their addiction they are not positively free to abstain from buying and using alcohol. They may be said to lack self-control because they are enslaved by an inner constraint. They may be outwardly free, but not inwardly free, and from some perspectives it is the 'inner' freedom that is most important. Their capacity to choose as a form of exercising free will is impeded. At their most complex, ideals of positive freedom may transcend individuals and become the condition of entire political communities, such as when they consent to live under a social contract that conforms to some 'general will'. Individuals and groups experience positive freedom in sublimating their personal wills to the general will, since this will is the 'true' expression of their 'real' selves.
Partly because of its association with totalitarian regimes -Sir Isaiah Berlin (1958 Berlin ( /1969 , for example, argued that positive freedom leads directly to totalitarianism -the ideal of positive freedom has often been attacked by proponents of liberalism. Recently, however, a renewed interest in the work of the 19 th century British Idealist T.H. Green has led to some interesting attempts to recuperate the declining stock of positive freedom (see for example, Brink 2003; Carter 2003; Dimova-Cookson 2001 and Wempe 2004) . In the remainder of this section I want to outline Maria Dimova-Cookson's re-interpretation of Green's distinction between negative and positive freedom, since it provides what I think is a potentially fruitful standpoint from which to consider some concrete responses to issues and concerns associated with the rise of a global network society.
In explicating Green's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom as a basis for thinking about freedom in the global network society Dimova-Cooksen identifies three conceptually prior distinctions. These are, in logical sequence, the distinctions between:
• Freedom in the 'personal realm' (i.e., freedom of the will) and freedom in the 'political realm' • 'Ordinary' action and 'moral' action; and • 'Juristic' freedom and 'true' freedom (a) Freedom in the personal realm (freedom of the will) and freedom in the political sphere
When we talk about freedom in the personal realm we are talking about an inner state that has to do with the quality of our voluntary action; of what we will ourselves to do. When we talk about freedom in the political realm we are talking about our 'willed' choices and actions in relation to other people within the public sphere and the opportunities and resources available within the society for pursuing goods. Freedom within the personal realm is all about the nature and quality of the 'goods' or 'objects' of our will to act in terms of our 'status' as 'beings' -or, specifically, as ethical beings or in relation to our 'moral' selves. This is what Dimova-Cookson (2004: 558) calls 'the moral psychology of freedom'. In Green's words, freedom in the personal sphere 'expresses a state of the soul, as distinct from a civil relation' (Green 1986: 352 n. 1; Dimova Cookson 2004: 558) . In the political sphere freedom expresses a 'civil relation' (DimovaCookson 2004 : 558) .
(b) Ordinary action and moral action
Dimova-Cookson coins this distinction to capture Green's ideas about moral development, the different kinds of 'goods' we can pursue, and the different descriptions under which people pursue goods (or objects of desire). In 'ordinary' action a person pursues something they want, simply under that description. This may be something that benefits them and only them. It may be something that benefits them and others. Or it may be something that benefits them at the cost of benefits to others. In an ordinary action 'an agent pursues her own good-not necessarily to the exclusion of the good of others but not necessarily to its inclusion' (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 510) . In 'moral' action, a person pursues goods under a different description that reflects an understanding that their personal good -what is good for them -is inherently bound up with the good of others. In moral action a person pursues a good 'in a "self-disinterested" manner' and as a 'good for others, as well as being good for the individual' (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513) . Moral action, then involves a degree of self-mastery … [an] overcoming of first order desires … While 'the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfied some desire", the moral good is "that which satisfies a desire of a moral agent'. For Green the moral good, which he also calls the true good, can be obtained when the agent sees his own good and the good of others as united. (Ibid. The references are to Green 1890: 178, 171).
(c) Juristic freedom and true freedom
In Green's theory this distinction applies to freedom in the personal realm, although it has direct significance to freedom in the public sphere -that is to say, for the distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom as interpreted by Dimova-Cookson. Juristic freedom refers to our power to act according to our preferences; the power to engage in 'ordinary action'. It is how human beings initially understand freedom; what Dimova-Cookson calls the 'primary' meaning of freedom. In Green's words, it is an expression of a person's 'assertion of himself against other men and against nature'. It is 'the first form of self-enjoyment . . . of the self-conscious spirit' (Green 1986a 121, 17-18) .
By contrast, what Green calls 'true' freedom consists in the voluntary pursuit of moral action: 'in the pursuit of self-perfection, in the pursuit of something that the individual believes to be truly good and that will bring him permanent satisfaction' (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513) . Moreover, When the exercise of juristic freedom ceases to satisfy the individual, since it no longer brings her a feeling of self-fulfillment, she discovers a new kind of freedom that can be achieved in the process of self-improvement … [P]ursuit of the moral good implies suspension of the pursuit of the ordinary good. As a moral agent I need to be prepared to deprive myself of something that I want only for myself for the purpose of obtaining something that is good in common to me and the others. The pursuit of 'true' freedom implies preparedness to limit our juristic freedom. Although they do not have to be, ordinary good and moral good, as well as juristic freedom and 'true' freedom, can be antagonistic to each other … [W]ithout juristic freedom there could be no 'true' freedom. The exercise of juristic freedom is a necessary step in the process of building the character that enables you to exercise 'true' freedom. These previous distinctions lead directly to Dimova-Cookson's interpretation of negative and positive freedom as distinct types of freedom within the political realm as elaborated in Green's larger theory of freedom, citizenship and moral personhood. The particular relevance of this interpretation -which appears idiosyncratic when set alongside most contemporary statements of social and political freedom -is that it conceives agents of negative and positive freedom alike in relation to the unequal social distribution of material resources and opportunities.
The nub of the argument is that there is a symmetrical relationship between 'juristic' and 'true' freedom in the personal domain and 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, respectively, in the political domain. Overarching all of this is the distinction between 'ordinary' and 'moral' action. Dimova-Cookson captures the relationships diagrammatically as follows:
Ordinary Action Moral Action Political Context
Negative Freedom Positive Freedom
Personal Context
Juristic Freedom Negative Freedom At the risk of oversimplification we can say that positive freedom is 'true' freedom in the political domain. When a person of means willfully acts in a way that puts some of their means at the disposal of those who lack means, out of a concern for the larger welfare of the society, that person can be said to experience positive freedom. In doing so s/he increases the possibility of 'juristic' freedom on the part of citizens who have less or 'inadequate' access to resources. Like 'true' freedom in the personal realm, 'positive freedom … is based on a voluntary sacrifice of juristic freedom' (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 521) . Positive freedom -doing as one wills within a societal context with a view to the betterment of that context -is achieved in contributing to the common social good.
An example from Green's own times and work may help clarify the distinction between negative and positive freedom. In the 1870s an Employers' Liability Act was passed by which the state imposed limits to the conditions under which employers could hire workers. It made employers responsible for such things as paying at least a minimal wage, ensuring certain safety conditions, being liable for compensation and so on. Representatives of employer interests argued that this was paternalistic and it robbed workers of their freedom to 'do what they would with their own': to decide whether they would sell their bodies for a certain rate of pay, take care of their own welfare and so on.
Against this position Green maintained that since many workers had no effective bargaining power, and were forced to work to ward off starvation, they had no freedom to do what they would with their own. Hence, they were not being denied the chance to exercise juristic freedom -since they had none to exercise with respect to their conditions of employment. On the contrary, limiting the juristic freedom of employers to hire workers at baseline conditions would actually help to establish a small space of (juristic) freedom for workers. Employers who willfully choose to limit their own juristic freedom to get labour for the lowest price they can thereby enact a freedom (positive freedom) that enlarge the space of juristic freedom in the public domain (which is 'negative' freedom). It increases the space in which others can do as they like. And in Green's (1986b) theory, experiencing the capacity to do as one likes is a necessary condition for becoming a moral agent in the first instance.
The demand for negative freedom is the demand for resource space to do some of what one likes. From the standpoint of the disadvantaged, the demand for negative freedom is for provisions that create a space for pursuing some 'ordinary' goods. When people have access to free education, health care, social benefits their juristic freedom is enlarged and they have some power to do as they want. They are free from restrictions to pursue things they like. They are, in fact, free from interferences to exercising choice, but as recipients of moral goods (flowing from the moral action of those who enact positive freedom). This is what makes it a negative freedom. It is a freedom that is received rather than produced, that flows into a vacuum rather than making space. Those who enact positive freedom are producers of moral goods. Only those who have the capacity to produce moral goods from their 'surplus' of resources can experience positive freedom. Those whose means are limited may nonetheless express demands for redistribution of resources that will provide a space of negative freedom.
Whether we are agents of positive or of negative freedom, we are dealing very much with the same issue: we are demonstrating awareness about the unequal distribution of resources in a society and the belief that this could be mended by some form of redistribution. 
(iii) Freedom as a 'triadic relation'
At the height of the debates between proponents of negative and positive freedom over which kind of freedom was more coherent, more properly regarded as freedom, or more important, Gerald MacCallum (1967) advanced the thesis that freedom is best understood as a single concept, upon which the various renditions of positive and negative freedom, freedom as opportunity and freedom as exercise, freedom as inner state and freedom as external condition, etc., converge. MacCallum proposed that freedom is best understood as a relational term that always necessarily (whether implicitly or explicitly) involves three variables. If values for all three variables are not apparent in particular freedom claims then these claims are elliptical, and the claimants should be invited to elucidate the values they assign to each variable.
According to MacCallum, freedom is capable of endless interpretations and appropriations so long as proponents can elucidate a 'subject' variable, a 'constraint' variable and an outcome or achievement variable. That is, coherent statements about freedom identify someone (or ones) who is free from some kind of limiting or preventing condition to do or be or become something. Hence, all freedom is simultaneously freedom from and freedom to: which is how negative freedom and positive freedom respectively have often been depicted. Any assertion that can provide meaningful values for these three variables is, to that extent, a coherent or intelligible assertion about freedom (or lack of freedom). Beyond that the debate is about values and substantive matters, not about concept. Hence, for example, the question about whether lack of access to resources of the kind involved in ascriptions of welfare rights involves differences of opinion over the extent of the 'constraint' variable. For some people constraints have to be limited to conditions that restrict people from exploiting means that are available to them for pursuing actual or possible desires/goods. For others, constraints should be seen also to include the absence of resources that reflect uneven distributions resulting from existing social arrangements.
In summary, freedom as a triadic relation takes the form: . This list is at most a tiny subset of the diverse issues and concerns that coalesce around the concept of freedom in relation to participation in the network society. It is in fact confined to a small subset of 'opportunity' freedoms: that is, freedoms in the sense of not being subject to various kinds of legal interferences to freedom of speech, information, and the like. The 'broadcast flag' issue offers an illustrative case in point -a case that has global significance on account of the fact that multinational capitalist corporate culture permeates the current form of 'the network society' on the national and global scale alike.
The 'broadcast flag' issue concerns the current transition in the US from analogue to digital TV broadcasting. In the US, film industry interests threatened to delay the transition from analogue to digital by saying they would withhold 'high-value content' from over-the-air digital TV unless the Federal Communications Commission imposed 'content protection' measures (Digital Rights Management) on all future televisions and associated devices. Content owners would insert a 'broadcast flag' into digital TV programming, so that when devices detect the flag they 'protect' the programming. In the US, from July 2005, digital TV tuners will not be able to be manufactured or imported legally unless they are equipped with FCC-mandated digital rights management technologies (http://www.eff.org/IP/ Video/HDTV/). This means that "whether you get your DTV over-the-air, from cable, or from satellite, you'll soon have DRM that interferes with your ability to do perfectly lawful things with DTV programming" (ibid.). The EFF informs users that if they purchase a digital TV tuner card prior to July 2005 they will retain the legal right to make digital recordings and copies of network TV programs, although not of cable and satellite TV programming. After that date all content will fall under the protection of the flag.
Obviously, all kinds of issues and counter issues, arguments and counter arguments can arise here. In order to consider what kinds of considerations policy deliberations and research activity might be pertinent it may prove fruitful to consider the 'scenario' sketched here for the broadcast flag in terms of the possible values that might be provided for the Agent, Constraint and Outcome variables of the 'triadic relation' analysis of freedom. The kinds of inflections that might be given to different explications of the three variables may help clarify issues that serious concern for participation, sustainability, access and the like should at least have to take into account.
For example, if A is someone who has a subscription to a TV service but whose commitments preclude viewing programs of interest at conflicting times, any impediment to recording content for viewing at a convenient time would be constrained. (A is constrained by DRM from exercising her subscription such that in her available leisure time she can enjoy entertainment she has actually paid for.
On the other hand, A might be a teacher (or a school, or a school department) who tries to maximise pupil engagement in curriculum by building popular cultural content copied from TV as excerpted 'critical incidents' into learning resources for class discussion. This might be part of a school approach to conserving scarce budget resources in the area of curriculum resources so that they can be used to help maintain the school's computing network. Relaxing the DRM measures might enlarge the teacher's/department's/school's freedom from technical barriers to recording material within fair usage bounds to use in attempts to create engaging curriculum resources and learning activities.
By contrast, the copyright holders (Agent) might complete the schema along the lines of being free from copying activities by individual subscribers (Constraint) to preserve their economic viability by maximising potential sales of the original product (Outcome). Laying the case out in this way might open debate up to a range of empirical considerations relevant to arguments advanced by or on behalf of 'owners' for giving them power to limit how publics use information. For example, in his paper 'Free software and beyond', Richard Stallman identifies 'exaggeration' as a characteristic argument strategy used by owners. He says:
Owners say that they suffer ``harm'' or ``economic loss'' when users copy programs themselves. But the copying has no direct effect on the owner, and it harms no one. (
ii) Learning management and pedagogical constraint
During the past five years proprietary software 'learning management systems' like Blackboard and WebCT have become standard environments for online courses and course components within universities in many countries around the world. In some countries, like Australia, they are practically ubiquitous. In many, although not all, universities that have 'bought into' learning management systems some degree of coercion (or 'encouragement') is applied to academic staff to integrate use of online environments into their teaching. Increasingly, 'encouragement' is becoming a 'requirement'. Furthermore, where institutions have adopted such learning management systems they often restrict teachers to using only such applications as have been sanctioned by the proprietary owners of the software to be embedded within their learning management system. Even though these learning management systems are costly, university administrations are largely favourable to them because they can facilitate a range of 'efficiencies' and, up to a point, provide a reading means for managing teaching activity. The semi automated nature of the software environment can 'deliver' 'economies' of time, and technical support and assistance can be standardised.
Use of learning management systems is still in its early stages and it is not possible to predict the kinds of issues that may emerge in time. At present many teachers find the systems to be a convenient adjunct to their work where they are still teaching conventional face to face courses. This might change, however, if university requirements move toward intensified online 'delivery' with less (or negligible) face to face teaching, larger class sizes and no provisions being made for the time required to communicate effectively online.
From the standpoint of freedom to teach (or learn) as one does best, or preferably, and to have space and opportunities to grow as teachers and learners, intensified use of learning management systems may generate diverse issues, and diverse ways of cashing out freedom in 'opportunityexercise terms, or as a triadic relation. For example:
• Imposition of standardised learning management systems may deny teachers the opportunity to have significant input into the design of the software environments in which to conduct their work as teachers • Use of standardised learning management systems may constrain the opportunities academics have to develop proficiency in a range of media that could be put to productive use in teaching and learning activities (including, to participate in open source product initiatives, collaborative experimental software design, etc.)
• Use of standardised learning management systems may constrain the opportunities academics have to imagine pedagogical possibilities that might result from their experimentation with resources/media like weblogs, wikis, voice over IP, graphic chat spaces, games, ipods, mobile phones, etc.
• Use of standardised learning management systems may constrain the opportunities learners have to engage in learning activities mediated by cultural artifacts resonant with their experiences and preferences • Use of standardised learning management systems may constrain the spaces university departments have to develop, support and implement solutions that reflect their character/ethos etc.
• Buying into proprietary software solutions constrains a university's options for developing, supporting and implementing solutions that it might (otherwise) prefer.
Here and elsewhere it is important to note that freedom should not be understood simply in terms of what people actually want at a point in time, but, rather, what they might plausibly want. Many academics with no previous interest in, or even knowledge of, various computing applications have become deeply interested in them following some contingency (e.g., parenthood, being challenged by a student or a colleague, etc.). Given the rapidity of change and the uncertainty of our times, keeping technology options as open as possible should be an institutional default position so far as preserving academic freedom is concerned.
(iii) Freedom from offence: Intellectual property and different cultural 'ways'
Michael Seadle (2002) distinguishes a 'soft side' to copyright that is concerned with matters beyond simply what will hold up in court with respect to the creation and use of intellectual property. He notes that within practically any legal jurisdiction in the contemporary world there exists a diverse range of indigenous and new migrant cultures. This means that within and across jurisdictions monolithic legal codes pertaining to intellectual property are presumed to apply equally to multiple or diverse cultural groupings. With respect to the US as a single case, Seadle notes that for the 2 million Native Americans (affiliated with 116 different tribes) and 28 million foreign-born residents, 'Title 17 of the US Code is supposed to serve as the final, official social contract on copyright. It is the law, and it does not recognize local variants among communities' (n.p.). He argues that it is becoming increasingly necessary for researchers to pursue 'access to the conceptual world' of other cultural groups so that discussion can take place that deals as well as possible with the potential tensions between the desire of social scientists for 'intellectual goods' and the right of informants to 'appropriate cultural respect'.
There is not space to go into Seadle's argument in any detail here, and it is important to note that he does not address his concerns using the language of 'freedom'. Nonetheless, some of the most important dimensions of the issues at stake are well cast in terms of freedom.
Briefly, Seadle looks at three factors central to the issues around copyright. These are Law (under which he includes the ethical codes of professions), Technology (where he emphasises the way digital technologies have engendered new issues, and are often treated differently under copyright law from other recording and publishing media), and Permissions. After addressing aspects of the legal issues around copyright that may arise, with particular emphasis on publishing data and works of the Web), Seadle identifies some of the ways new digital technologies would impact on well-known excerpts in Levi-Strauss's Tristes Tropiques, Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures, and Kluckhorn and Leighton's The Navaho.
The following extract from Seadle's discussion of permissions illustrates some of the points at which issues of freedom bite.
Because of all the implicit assumptions of which neither side may be completely aware, cross-cultural permissions are problematic. Can a community that has little or no direct experience with digital video and the Internet give a meaningful permission that allows researchers to record them and publish the interview on their personal home pages? Probably not. They may just not care, and the bottom line with US copyright law is that the rights owner must object before any legal action can be taken to prevent infringement. Although deliberate and repeated violation can be expensive, thus far most Web publication cases do not go beyond a letter-of-objection and the removal of the offending copy. Such copyright risktaking appears pragmatic in the short term, but any de facto violation of US copyright law could also have strong potential for violating the intellectual property customs of a less individualistic community.
Some anthropologists recommend getting informants to give a verbal permission at the beginning of each recording. This excellent practice protects researchers from violations of US law and should certainly be encouraged. Whether such permission is meaningful in the informant's conceptual world may not be immediately clear to the researcher. And what to do after finding out that the persons giving permission did not, in their own society, have the right to do so, remains an issue that researchers must come to term with on their own Seadle 2002, n.p.).
Obviously, there are all sorts of ethical, legal, and political concepts besides freedom that can be used to articulate and to focus issues in this area. Freedom, however, is certainly one of the foremost among them. And the range of different facets it can be used to clarify is quite wide, as we can see if we apply MacCallum's schema -A is free from X to do, etc. Y -to the passage cited above. For example:
• A researcher is constrained by the fact that her informant did not have the power to convey permission from publishing a paper that would advance her career significantly
• A cultural group is constrained from protecting sensitive information by the fact that a person entitled to do so gave permission to a researcher to publish the informant's account of certain facts
• A research community is prevented from being able to use a rich data set by the decision of one of its members to take cultural sensitivity issues so seriously as to recognise that 'meaningful permission' had not been obtained for its use and withdraws the data set.
(iv) Freedom as 'free' and 'open': Ethics and efficiency
The ambiguity of freedom that often lies beneath surface level talk becomes apparent in when we look at the issue of free software and collaborative software development. Interestingly, one line of exploration leads reasonably directly to ideas and issues related to positive freedom as described above. This involves the differences within the Linux community between the 'free software' movement represented by the GNU project spearheaded by Richard Stallman and the Open Source Initiative that coalesces around the 'Open Source Definition' provided by Bruce Perens. Once again, space limits preclude opening this issue up in the depth it deserves. Fortunately, public spokespersons for both positions seem agreed on what the key differences are. Hence, it is possible to gloss the perspectives with minimal risk of distortion.
'Free software' and 'open source' are united in their opposition to software being proprietary. They differ, however, in their underlying premises -to the point of representing a different ethos from one another -and in their strategic and tactical approaches. Thus, according to The Official Guide to Slackware Linux (see Chapter 1 at < http://slackbook.lizella.net/chapter1-opensource.html>) the Free Software movement … is working toward the goal of making all software free of intellectual property restrictions, which it believes hamper technical improvement and work against the good of the community. The Open Source movement is working toward most of the same goals, but takes a more "pragmatic" approach to them, preferring to base its arguments on the economic and technical merits of making source code freely available, rather than the moral and ethical principles that drive the Free Software Movement.
At one level the issues of freedom surrounding the open source -free software movement (and bridging its two sub-movements) can be represented by a freedom as opportunity (removal of legal restrictions to do with intellectual property/copyright, making source code available for modification, etc.). The issue of freedom is about challenging legal constraints that limit options for software users and developers.
Similarly, if we use the triadic relation analysis of 'freedom' we would find that to a large extent the three variables can be cashed out in ways that would be agreeable to both the 'free software' and 'open source' arms of the movement.
• Users are free from copyright constraints to make copies to share with friends • Developers are free from code closure to modify programs in search of continual improvement
Others who are more familiar with the history and concerns of this community would be able to provide many renditions of the three variables that would bridge the differences within the Linux community.
When we look more closely at the Free Software Movement, however, we find concepts and arguments that support extensions of the variables in the freedom triad that are not available from the perspective of the Open Source Initiative. A brief excerpt from Richard Stallman's writings will serve to make the present point. In this excerpt Stallman is responding to the argument that having owners of software is important and good because it leads to production of more software. He accepts that the argument is based on the valid goal of satisfying software users, and says it is true that people will produce more of something if they are paid well for doing so. However, he argues that the position has a flaw (which, incidentally, explains why for the Free Software movement it is not a necessary part of the meaning of 'free software' that it not cost anything and may, in fact, be sold without contradiction). Stallman (1998a: n.p.) says:
[T]he economic argument has a flaw: it is based on the assumption that the difference is only a matter of how much money we have to pay. It assumes that 'production of software' is what we want, whether the software has owners or not.
People readily accept this assumption because it accords with our experiences with material objects. Consider a sandwich, for instance. You might well be able to get an equivalent sandwich either free or for a price. If so, the amount you pay is the only difference. Whether or not you have to buy it, the sandwich has the same taste, the same nutritional value, and in either case you can only eat it once.
Whether you get the sandwich from an owner or not cannot directly affect anything but the amount of money you have afterwards. Society also needs freedom. When a program has an owner, the users lose freedom to control part of their own lives.
And above all society needs to encourage the spirit of voluntary cooperation in its citizens. When software owners tell us that helping our neighbors in a natural way is 'piracy', they pollute our society's civic spirit.
… As a computer user today, you may find yourself using a proprietary (18k characters) program. If your friend asks to make a copy, it would be wrong to refuse. Cooperation is more important than copyright. But underground, closet cooperation does not make for a good society. A person should aspire to live an upright life openly with pride, and this means saying 'No' to proprietary software.
You deserve to be able to cooperate openly and freely with other people who use software. You deserve to be able to learn how the software works, and to teach your students with it. You deserve to be able to hire your favorite programmer to fix it when it breaks.
This, I would argue, comes very close to the ideas addressed in Dimova-Cookson's interpretation of T. H. Green's positive freedom. To be sure, purchasers of software differ from the hardpressed workers whose 'freedom' to work for minimal subsistence wages and in dangerous conditions without recourse to compensation Green repudiated. For a start, anybody seeking software enjoys above subsistence level material resources. At the same time, most software purchasers have little or no 'discretionary space' so far as options are concerned -they are effectively hostaged to proprietary software for lack of knowledge, experience, confidence, proficiency etc., to seek alternatives or even to know that alternatives exist. Moreover, proprietary software is horrendously expensive, and many people try to make do without a particular application rather than break the law by ontaining an illegal copy. Stallman envisages a computing world in which people who have expertise and resources and who want to share these should be able to do so as 'the default mode' rather than as a risk or as a marginalised practice. This, he believes, will support the development of collaborative and sharing behaviour more generally: which is to say, behaviour conducive to the development of a world that is morally superior to the one we inhabit. It seems not unreasonable to think of those who wilfully put their surplus resources at the disposal of those whose options are constrained as producing moral goods, which others receive as ordinary goods. Where 'the masses' software users gain the confidence to demand free-open source software as a negative freedom we have a version of the kind of entitlement demand that Dimova-Cookson describes. Stallman's 'deserve' refrain in the final paragraph of the excerpt cited above speaks out of an ethical discourse of entitlement that resonates with Dimova-Cookson's position.
(v) Freedom to access information for local development: The Jhai Foundation Rural IT Network in Laos
The Jhai Foundation (<http://www.jhai.org/>) is a voluntary organisation operating in Laos. It has a Board of Directors, is committed to a reconciliation model of development, and conducts its work with a high ratio of volunteer workers -ranging from local children to Laotian and international experts. It emerged as a response to the ravages of the bombing of Laos during the Vietnam War period. "We like self-help. We insist on sustainability. We design for impact. We are most interested in relationships. We are demonstrating how, after such a devastating war, people from opposite sides can reconcile by working side-by-side. We call this the reconciliation process of development" (<http://www.jhai.org/>)
The Foundation undertakes projects concerned with economic development, education, coffee and information technology (see Anderson 2005) . Participants are evenly distributed among Laotian locals, Lao-Americans, military veterans, and volunteers from anywhere in the world. These needs have generated a project designed for local conditions, which include no electricity, no telephone lines, torrential rains and high temperatures, thick dust, a high incidence of minimal literacy, and non-English speaking local populations. The project has three components.
• A purpose-developed robust computer and printer that can survive the environmental conditions, draw minimal power that can be provided by pedal-powered generators supported by solar power and are built from off the shelf components.
• An 802.11b protocol wireless LAN connecting 5 villages using relay stations on the hills, a solar-powered repeater station, and a local ISP in a larger centre.
• A Lao-language version of the free Linux-based KDE desktop and office tools in Lao.
(http://www.jhai.org/jhai_remoteIT.htm; also Anderson 2005) .
Villagers using the communications centre will be able to make national and international telephone calls using voice-over-IP, as well as use desktop and internet applications for accounting, letter writing, e-mail and other business and educational purposes. Children and youth in the villages will undertake technology and small enterprise training. Some of these will join the project as Youth IT Entrepreneurs, and after training will support the adults in learning and using the technologies and in business operations.
Because of the need for sustainability, extreme cost-effectiveness, and durability and robustness, the project has called for access to high level technical expertise on a voluntary and low budget basis. The goals and potential advantages are high. According to the Chair of the Foundation:
right now, the villagers have no way of telling what the market is in the big towns they sell their stuff to, telling what the weather report is for their crops, things like that. This will absolutely change that. Plus, they will be able to talk to relatives in America some of them they haven't seen in decades" (Thorn, http://www.jhai.org/ n.p.).
Neil Anderson (2005: 36) reports that these goals have been achieved in the trial village, and that plans are currently under way to extend the program to four other Laotian villages as well as in international sites.
I find this example especially interesting in relation to freedom and sharing in the global network society. On the level of information technologies and societal participation, we have a case of modest access to appropriate technologies being integrated into pursuit of more effective economic performance at the level of the village by helping to alleviate constraints like lack of relevant information (current commodity prices, important weather information), minimal networks for marketing products in potentially lucrative markets, low levels of business-related knowledge and 'finesse' of the kinds that command respect and attention in the world of enterprise, etc. At this level the freedom variables could be elaborated in such ways as:
• Village producers are free from lack of weather (or horticultural, scientific) information to maximize their crop productivity.
• Village producers are free from inadequate information about prices, markets, etc., to maximize the economic returns on their commodity production.
• Village producers are free from lack of potentially useful networks to pursue the development of marketing and distribution channels for accessing economically viable (or lucrative) markets • Local youth are free from constraints to obtaining knowledge and skills that will prepare them to participate in the development of enterprises rather than to be unemployed.
Interestingly, there seems to be less scope here than might be anticipated to think in terms of negative and positive freedom along the lines elaborated by Dimova-Cookson. This is because the model of development that defines the Jhai Foundation's work is conceived in terms of reconciliation. This is about reciprocity, mutual needs, and resolving the past in ways that can build a morally and materially richer future for all parties than could otherwise have been the case. This is about negotiated and respectful sharing of resources -given that trust and forgiveness, understanding and compassion, are resources for living well, every bit as much as are resources of expertise and infrastructure. People can only share what is already theirs to share. On this definition, the 'owner' of a machine and of a copy of proprietary software can share the use of their computer, but they cannot share the software to the extent of giving someone a copy, because a 'copy' is not theirs to give. By contrast, every person who in any way and to any degree had at any time been involved in the development of the Linux base for the computer was, by the very social relations of its collaborative production brought, wittingly or unwittingly, into moral relationship with the work of the Jhai Foundation and the lives of its members and those they live and work with.
Conclusion
Freedom is an elastic concept that can mean all things to all people. This reflects the value that attaches to freedom as a signifier. Other things being equal, the fact that some state of affairs, process, arrangement, etc., can plausibly be said to enhance freedom is a point in its favour. Plausibility, however, is of the essence here, particularly in the hard-headed world of policy development. Consequently, it behooves anybody who seeks to enlist 'freedom talk' in the cause of influencing policy development to take care with the claims that are made about freedom. This begins with paying due attention to conceptual work.
This paper is at best preliminary. I do not pretend that the conceptual work essayed in this paper on behalf of 'freedom talk' in relation to issues and concerns associated with the emergence of network societies is adequate, or even robust. I would, however, claim that anyone who can do well the kind of work this paper has tried to undertake would be making a genuine contribution to the development of worthwhile policy options and models for bridging digital divides.
